First phase of the 2014 Revolutionary war

In January 2014 Bulgaria witnessed an unusually harsh winter, followed by a sudden rise in temperatures. The Rhodope mountain areas and the central Balkan were devastated by avalanches. By mid-February temperatures began to rise quickly, and the snow deposits melted, creating flash floods and landslides in central Bulgaria. The damage was enormous: Sofia's Iskar dam, suffering from chronic mismanagement and poor maintenance, broke and flooded the capital city. At least 6,000 people were killed by the floods, and most of the infrastructure was submerged. In a country where the bulk of administrative and economic assets are concentrated in the capital, this proved to be a paralysing catastrophe. Only a week later, the Maritsa river came out of its bed and caused unprecedented damage to Plovdiv and other cities along its path. It also flooded most of the Maritsa basin, including the Maritsa Iztok power complex and its surrounding coal mines. This not only created an environmental disaster, but it also disabled the largest power generating capacity in the country, throwing most of Bulgaria in darkness. In the north, the Kozloduy nuclear power station was also shut down because of flooding, although no accidents occurred there. Most of the fertile plains ended up submerged.

Thus, in less than two months, Bulgaria found itself with its major cities flooded, its largest industrial assets disabled, and its agriculture crippled. The government of Plamen Oresharski decided to initiate emergency legislature, giving extraordinary powers to the Ministry of the Interior and the Defence Ministry. The Bulgarian Army was mobilised to repair the damage and restore order at least in Sofia, Plovdiv, Veliko Tarnovo and the port city of Varna, while the rural areas were left to fend for themselves. The populist opposition, led by authoritarian Boyko Borisov, blamed the government of Oresharski for purposefully initiating the floods in order to concentrate power. A large sum of followers gathered around Borisov's populist party, CEDB, and clashes between government supporters and opponents soon erupted. Riots among the community of illegal Syrian immigrants and the Roma only served to exacerbate the situation.

In this chaos, the Bulgar Rouge quickly organised armed platoons in northwest Bulgaria, which has traditionally been ignored by the authorities, and where the government was doing nothing to remove the consequences of the natural disasters. On 14 March, they captured the villages of General Marinovo, Druzhba and Peshakovo near Vidin. Their offensive remained unnoticed. Only three days later, five platoons of the National People's Liberation Army (NPLA) entered Vidin, captured the mayor's office and provincial government building, and raised the banner of the Democratic Republic of Bulgar Rouge. They also ceased the weapons cache of the local police force, which was caught by surprise and offered no resistance. The Bulgar Rouge's HQ was set up in the Baba Vida fortress.

The central government initially did not consider this a threat and decided to devote its already limited resources in maintaining order in the increasingly anarchic cities. By April, most of Vidin Province was under Bulgar Rouge control. The capture of Vidin and the public execution of its unpopular governors both instilled fear in Bulgar Rouge opponents and courage in its supporters. The latter quickly joined the ranks of the NPLA and were turned to political commissars and foot soldiers. By 15 April, the NPLA numbered 3,000 armed men. The Bulgar Rouge quickly found a source of revenue by capturing the Vidin-Kalafat bridge and used the tolls to procure contraband weapons and supplies for the NPLA. The government was seeing these developments as alarming, and was preparing to dispatch units of the Bulgarian Army to quell the militant offensive.