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Air Defence Command
An S-125 launcher of the ADC in central Bulgaria.
The Air Defence Command is not a separate branch of the NPLA, but is considered "autonomous" - this means it can voluntarily be detached from the Army units, to which it nominally belongs. The Air Defence Command is the most high-tech and potent defence component of the NPLA, and is given top priority in funding, upgrades and administrative organisation. Intelligence reports suggest it expands and improves at a rapid pace, constantly introducing new systems into operation.
Until the Fatherland War, Special Establishment 56 in Sofia was the only location with a three-tier air defence system. The first tier consists of a long-range S-300 battery of 5 launchers. The second tier employs a battery of 10 medium-range S-125 systems and 5 medium-range Osa units. The third tier is primarily for short-range defence, including three Strela-10 units, approximately 40 air defence guns of medium calibre (57 to 85-mm), about 40 ZU-23-2 AA guns, seven ZSU-23-4 self-propelled AA guns, and some 50 Strela-3 and Igla MANPADS nests. Subsequently, three-tier coverage of this type was expanded to most other parts of the country.
After the Revolution some 1,500 air defence guns, including 57-, 85- and 100-mm types of Soviet origin were stationed near arms depots, heavy equipment garages and political headquarters. A larger number of ZPU-4 units supplemented these heavy AA guns for lower-altitude engagements. While most of these were initially unguided, it is assumed that some 40% of AAA batteries were equipped with SON-9 fire control radars of local manufacture no later than five years after the Revolution. Foreign intelligence sources assume that the SON-9 was reverse-engineered by the People's Institute of Atomic Energy, an umbrella term for NPLA-controlled weapons research institutes.
As with other branches of the military, the Fatherland War provided a trial-by-fire for the Air Defence Command. Massive losses of ground assets prompted a thorough and rapid modernisation of the air defence network based on the experience of the war. Emphasis was put on short-range systems to counter cruise missile and anti-radiation missile attacks, radar and launcher mobility, subterranean air defence bases and mission-specific systems like the ZRK-33 Gavrosh. This crew-portable air defence system (CPADS) is a significantly up-scaled development based on the ubiquitous Igla systems that saw widespread usage during the Fatherland and Continuation Wars, but proved too short-ranged and underpowered to make a real impact. The Gavrosh system was developed to overcome these weaknesses while retaining the option to deliver compact systems to small ground formations.
The Air Defence Command is the prime example of a fluid chain of command, or "army of the people-masses" in Bulgar Rouge military parlance.
The air defence forces operate at least a dozen long-range radar stations which provide multi-channel coverage of most of the country's territory. Five 36D6 Tin Shield radar units provide coverage south of Stara Planina, where the largest concentration of enemy air activity would be expected during war. These units were part of S-300 Surface-to-Air (SAM) complexes, but were detached from the S-300 batteries and installed on fixed towers. Of the remaining five Tin Shield units, two are located on the Black Sea Coast, two in the Danubian plain region and one near Special Establishment No. 56. These are highly capable systems with high jamming and decoy resistance, a friend-or-foe capability, and simultaneous processing of up to 100 targets. Additionally, eight P-38, six P-40 and three P-14MABG radars are used as basic early warning radars due to their very long range (350, 370 and 600 kilometres, respectively).
Secondary coverage is provided by a number of older generation radars such as some 60-70 P-19 (Flat Face B) radars for lower altitude engagements and detection. Unlike Tin Shield systems, the NPLA Air Defence force has retained the mobility of these and uses them to augment weaker areas of the detection network. Some of the fixed SAM and radar sites have been upgraded by North Korean technicians with elevating pads, which could be hidden below ground if a threat is present.
Locally-designed "Vodopad" passive sensors have also been deployed, but little is known about their capabilities. It is assumed they're roughly equivalent to the Kolchuga passive sensor and constitute the "high-altitude" layer of the detection network. "Vodopad" passive sensors have been spotted on satellite imagery and are usually located on elevated positions like mountaintops and monitor the airspace for stealthy targets in higher altitudes of flight. In areas where such visibility is limited, like mountain valleys, short-range, high-power conventional radars are used.
Model | Type | Range | In service | Notes |
Long-range SAM/ABM | 500 km | 4 | Four launchers on alert, but warhead still in testing phase | |
S-75 Dvina | Medium-range SAM | 45 km | 90 | Upgraded guidance systems. |
S-93 Maranya | Medium-range EMP SAM | 50 km | 55 | Local EMP version of the S-75 |
S-125 Pechora | Medium-range SAM | 35 km | 128 | Upgraded; some analog controls replaced with digital units. |
S-200 Vega | Long-range SAM | 300 km | 10 | - |
2K11 Krug | Medium-range SAM | 55 km | 4 | Restored from museum stocks. |
2K12 Kub | Medium-range SAM | 24 km | 30 | - |
S-300PMU-1 | Long-range SAM | 120 km | 12 | - |
9K33 Osa-AKM | Medium-range SAM | 15 km | 15 | - |
9K35 Strela-10 | Short-range SAM | 5 km | 80 | - |
